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ESSAY

RACE-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
JordanJ. Paust*

International law, which is part of the supreme law of the United
States,' provides significant affirmation of the legal propriety of racebased affirmative action. At least two human rights treaties ratified by the
United States are particularly useful in identifying the acceptability of
certain measures of affirmative action as well as the duty to take special
and concrete measures of affirmative action in certain circumstances. Such
a duty is not merely based in supreme federal law, relevant to decisionmaking at federal and state levels, but is also contained in federal policy
relevant to the constitutional precept of federal preemption. Treaty-based
legal acceptability does not guarantee that particular measures of affirmative action will survive challenges under other constitutional provisions,
such as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but it is pertinent to a
continuing or emerging meaning of constitutional rights and competencies. Indeed, treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action coupled with
relevant duties provide a compelling state interest for both federal and
state initiatives.
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),2 a
fundamental human rights treaty ratified by the United States,3 contains a
norm of non-discrimination in Article 2 that prohibits distinctions based
on race (among other categories) in connection with the enjoyment of
* Law Foundation Professor, University of Houston; Edward Ball Eminent Scholar Chair
in International Law, Florida State University, (1997); J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University; LL.M.,
University of Virginia (1972); J.D., University of California at Los Angeles (1968); A.B.,
University of California at Los Angeles (1965).
1. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Ross v. Rittenhouse, 2 U.S. (2
Dali.) 160, 162 (1792); United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 R Cas. 686, 692
(D.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (Case No. 16,726); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 27 (1792); Peters v. McKay, 238
P.2d 255, 230-31 (Ore. 1951); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF

THE UNITED STATES, § 111, cmnt. d (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; infra notes 42, 47.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
3. Ratified on September 8, 1992. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 261 (3rd ed. 1995).
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human rights recognized in the treaty by all individuals within a signatory's territory or subject to its jurisdiction. Article 26 of the ICCPR also

4. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 2, para. 1, at 173. The proscription includes a "distinction of
any kind" based on prohibited categories "such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Id. On the general
prohibition of race-based discrimination under international law, see, e.g., MYRES S.
McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 583-601 (1980).
Actually, rights concerning education as such are not addressed directly in the ICCPR, but
application of the norm of non-discrimination to educational processes is provided by the
general rights of all persons to be "equal before the law;' to "equal protection of the law," and to
"equal and effective protection against discrimination" contained in Article 26 of the ICCPR.
ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 26, at 179. Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, a treaty which the United States has signed but not yet ratified, also
expressly sets forth rights concerning education. International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 13, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 8 [hereinafter Economic Rights
Covenant]. President Carter signed the Economic Rights Covenant in 1977 and sent it to the
Senate for advice and consent. See LILICH & HANNUM, supra note 3, at 197-98, 240. The
norm of non-discrimination is contained in Article 2, paragraph 2; but there is a broad
"clawback" clause in Article 4, allowing limitations "determined by law" that are "compatible
with the nature of ... [the] rights" set forth in the treaty and are "solely for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society," which may apply to certain forms of
affirmative action. Even the right to education in connection with higher education has language
compatible with affirmative action: "[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible to all,
on the basis of capacity, by every appropriatemeans." Economic Rights Covenant, supra, art.
13, para. 2(c), at 8 (emphasis added). See id. art. 13, para. 1, at 8 (The goals of education include
the "[enabling of] all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding,
tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups.").
Under international law, the United States can take no action inconsistent with the object
and purpose of a treaty that it has signed but has not yet ratified. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336. Although the Vienna
Convention has also not been ratified by the United States, this provision (and others mentioned
below) are considered by the United States to reflect customary international law. See, e.g.,
JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 286-87 n.595, 318 n.5
(1996).
The Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93
[hereinafter CADE], which the United States has neither signed nor ratified, prohibits
"'discrimination' includ[ing] any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference" Id. art. 1, para.
1, at 96. However, certain educational processes involving distinctions concerning sex, religion,
or language are permissible under Article 2. Article 4 of the CADE expresses the undertaking of
signatories to "apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances ....
will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment." Id. art. 4, at 48. In effect, this
emphasizes dual policy prongs of opportunity and treatment through circumstantially appropriate methods. Article 10 of the treaty states that it "shall not have the effect of diminishing the
rights which individuals or groups may enjoy by virtue of [other international] agreements ...
where such rights are not contrary to the letter or spirit of' the CADE. Id. art. 10, at 102. It is
apparent from materials and points that follow that rights pertaining to affirmative action of
individuals and groups under the ICCPR and the Race Discrimination Convention, discussed
infra, are not necessarily inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the CADE which itself emphasizes the need for appropriate methods that will "tend to promote equality of opportunity."
CADE, supra, art. 4, at 48. Indeed, the preamble to the Race Discrimination Convention, infra
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recognizes that "[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law," adding a
specific right to "equal and effective protection against discrimination on
any ground such as race."5 Even a derogation or "clawback" clause in
Article 4 of the ICCPR that allows signatories to deviate from full protection of certain rights "to the extent strictly required" in time of public
emergency ("the existence of which is officially proclaimed") contains a
proviso that derogations "not involve discrimination solely on the ground
of race" or certain other categories. 6 Thus, race-based discrimination as
such is generally impermissible under the ICCPR.
One can identify a textual difference in the treaty between an Article 2
"distinction" and "discrimination" within the meaning of Articles 4 and
26. By using different terms, the treatymakers imply, perhaps counterintuitively, that a "distinction" is not necessarily "discrimination. 7 In fact,
Article 4 contains the evidently more limiting phrase "solely on the
ground of."' Whatever the reasons, it is apparent that the prohibition in
Article 2(1) of a "distinction of any kind" is more sweeping in coverage
than the prohibitions of "discrimination" contained in Articles 4 and 26.
From a solely textual viewpoint, Article 2(1) stands more closely in
opposition to race-based affirmative action than do Articles 4 or 26.'
Regardless, both of these general rights or guarantees involving distinctions (in Article 2) or discrimination (in Article 26) are derogable. °
For this reason, a signatory might permit actions in derogation of Articles
2(1) and 26 that meet the test concerning derogable measures found in
note 11, refers to the CADE. As developed later, infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text, the

provisions of the Race Discrimination Convention allow affumative action.
Institutions of higher education should expressly recognize that they will not "discriminate"

solely on the basis of any such grounds. For example, some universities do not expressly
mention "religion" or "political or other opinion" as protected classes even though the ICCPR,
as U.S. treaty law, is supreme federal law.
5. ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 26, at 179.
6. Id. art. 4, para. 1, at 174. Even if arguably necessary, no derogation is permitted with
respect to certain human rights. See id. art. 4, para. 2, at 174. However, the rights to be "equal
before the law" and to "equal protection of the law;' id. art. 26, at 179, are not among the nonderogable rights listed in Article 4, paragraph 2-nor is the norm of non-discrimination
(concerning "distinctions") contained in Article 2, paragraph 1, although Article 4, paragraph 1,
contains a prohibition concerning "discrimination" as such that is also tied to the limiting phrase
"solely on the ground of:'
7. See also infra notes 12, 26, 35-38 and accompanying text.
8. ICCPR, supra note 2, art 4, para. 1, at 174. Admissions or hiring decision processes
utilizing race as one factor among several might appear to involve "distinctions" on the basis of
race, but certainly are not decisions based "solely on the ground of' race (whether or not they
involve "discrimination").
9. But see infra notes 12, 29, 37-41 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 6.
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Article 4. Using such a test, the ICCPR would allow some "distinctions"
based on race that do not amount to "discrimination solely on the ground

of race" if, in time of public emergency officially proclaimed, such distinctions are "strictly required." Yet, affirmative action programs in higher
education, if based on "distinctions" and arguably not "discrimination" as

such, are not likely to meet such a test, whether or not there is an officially
proclaimed public emergency. This is because, while affirmative action
"distinctions" may be useful, rational, or reasonable, they are not likely to
be "strictly required""
Despite this evident textual meaning of the treaty, however, the United
States adopted a formal "Understanding" during the ratification process
that would permit certain forms of affirmative action. The Understanding
states in pertinent part: "The United States understands distinctions based
upon race"-as those terms are used in Article 2, paragraph 1 and Article
26-to be permitted when such distinctions are, "at [a] minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective."' 2

11. See Symposium, Security of the Person and Security of the State: Human Rights and
Claims of National Security, 9 YALE J.WORLD PUB. ORD. 1 (1982) (regarding derogation tests).
Concerning the differences between the human rights derogation "strictly required" or reasonable necessity test and U.S. domestic tests of strict scrutiny and rational basis, see, e.g., Jordan J.
Paust, The Human Right to Die With Dignity: A Policy-Oriented Essay, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 463,
471 n.17, 477 n.30, 484-85 n.63 (1995).
Perhaps one could show that in particular circumstances affirmative action was reasonably
necessary, but the threshold is quite high. Since special meanings of the treaty terms pertain,
however, proof of reasonable necessity will generally not be required. Special meanings hinge
upon various policies at stake and something akin to a contextual or reasonable rationality test.
See infra notes 12, 29-30, 37-41 and accompanying text; cf International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 1,
para. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 216 [hereinafter Race Discrimination Convention] (allowing measures aimed at the "adequate'advancement of... groups or individuals requiring such protection
as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of
human rights." Thus, advancement need not be strictly required, but the form of protection
should be necessary in order to ensure enjoyment or protection, as if non-use of such a measure
would not ensure equal enjoyment or protection).
12. S.REP. No. 102-23, at 22 (1992), reprintedin 31 I.L.M. 645, 659 (1992). In the Report
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations addressing the ICCPR, it was noted that the
Committee created by the ICCPR had interpreted it to allow certain forms of "differentiation":
In interpreting the relevant (ICCPR] provisions, the Human Rights Committee has observed that not all differentiation in treatment constitutes discrimination,
if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is
to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the [ICCPR]. In its General Comment on nondiscrimination, for example, the Committee noted that the enjoyment
of rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical treatment in
every instance.
Id. at 14.
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This Understanding appears to contain two errors. First, Article 2 pro-

hibits a "distinction of any kind" based on race and the Understanding uses
the phrase "distinctions based on race." This error may be mitigated because
"distinctions" might not constitute impermissible "discrimination" within
the meaning of Article 26 which is also cited in the Understanding. Second,
the proffered test involving a rational relation to a legitimate governmental
objective uses a far lower threshold concerning permissibility than does the
strict requirements test found in Article 4 which should be used in connection with permissible derogations from the guarantees contained in Article 2.
From this, one can conclude that the U.S. Understanding operates in a
manner that "purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
The Human Rights Committee had stated:
[Tihe principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action
in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the [ICCPR] .... Such action may involve granting for a
time ... certain preferential treatment in specific matters... [A]s long as such action
is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the [ICCPR].
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, Hum. Rts. Comm,, General Comment 18, para. 10, at 27, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/I
(1992) [hereinafter Human Rights Comments]; See Neil A.F. Popovic, CCRI's Hidden Conflict:
Prop 209 Would Violate Human Rights Treaties Recently Ratified by the U.S. Senate, THE
RECORDER, Oct. 9, 1996, at 4. See also Human Rights Comments, supra, General Comment 18,
para. 13, at 27 ("Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the
criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a
purpose which is legitimate under the [ICCPR],'); Considerationof Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., para. 30, at 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/Cf79/Add.50 (1995) (noting that "[t]he Committee emphasizes the need for the government [of the United States] to increase its efforts .... where appropriate, through the adoption of
affirmative action"). Attorney Popovic's insightful comment also addresses the Race Discrimination Convention and concludes that both treaties allow affirmative action, the Race
Discrimination Convention even requires affirmative action in some cases, and the California
initiative, see infra note 52, would be invalidated under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Popovic, supra. These same points are made more recently in an important inquiry
into possible effects of the treaties, especially concerning civil rights litigation. See Connie de la
Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CNN. L.
REv. 423,455,467-68,470 (1997).
The Human Rights Committee had also addressed the propriety of "affirmative action" with
respect to sex-based discrimination. See Human Rights Comments, supra, General Comment No.
4, para. 2, at 3-4. Cases brought under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, better known as the European Convention on Human Rights, have also recognized that objective and reasonable differences in
treatment are not proscribed "discrimination." See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), para. 226-27, at 85-86 (1977); The Belgian Linguistic Case, Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A), at 34-35 (1968). The European Court of Justice has also recognized the propriety of
affirmative action while placing limits on particular applications. See Case C-450/93, Eckhard
Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen 1995 E.C.R. 1-3069, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 265 (1996),
with an introductory note by Nancy Perkins, id. at 265-68.
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provisions of the treaty in their application to that State."' 3 "However
phrased or named," the Understanding operates as a reservation to the
treaty.' 4 A reservation that is "incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty" is void ab initio,5 but it is highly questionable whether the U.S.
reservation retaining the legal propriety of certain rationally related
"distinctions," presumably including certain forms of affirmative action, is
necessarily incompatible with the overall object and purpose of the
ICCPR.' 6 If the reservation is legally operative, then certain forms of racebased affirmative action are permitted as a matter of U.S. treaty law (i.e.,
they are "permitted" whenever such distinctions are rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective). At a minimum, the U.S. Understanding contains a formal expression of federal policy relevant to the propriety
of affirmative action, the interpretation of other federal laws, and the
operation of federal preemption.
THE RACE DISCRIMINATION CONVENTION

The other significant treaty, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Discrimination
13. Quoted language is from the test in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 1(d), at 333. On its customary nature, see PAUST, supra note 4, at 28687, 381-82. If the U.S. understanding had not used the term "distinctions" and had not expressly
noted "as those terms are used in Article 2:' one could conclude that the understanding was not
an attempt to exclude or modify the legal effect of the term "distinction" contained in Article 2.
The United States could have used the term "differentiations" and referred to the Human Rights
Committee's Comment No. 18, see Human Rights Comments, supra note 12, General Comment
No. 18, at 25, but it did not. Thus, the Understanding does appear to purport to exclude or
modify the legal effect of Article 2.
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, art. 2, para. I(d), at 333. If it
were not a reservation, the Understanding would still be a significant part of the treaty package
consented to by the Senate and ratified by the President. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,
§ 314, cmnt. d.
15. See id. art. 19, at 336; PAUST, supra note 4, at 286-87, 318, 366-68, 373-76.
16. See also supra notes 12-13; infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text; cf. General
Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Addendum, Hum. Rts. Comm., General
Comment No. 24 (52), para. 9, at 3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.6, (1994) [hereinafter
Comment No. 24] ("[A] reservation to the obligation to respect and ensure the rights, and to do
so on a non-discriminatory basis (Article 2 (1)) would not be acceptable."). With respect to the
Committee's General Comment No. 24, there is room for argument that affirmative action
differentiations, or even "distinctions" (the term used in the U.S. Understanding), are not
proscribed "discrimination" the treaty referring to "distinction" and the Committee referring to
"discriminatory" (and otherwise not addressing affirmative action or special measures as such).
Indeed, its prior General Comment had already recognized such differing uses of these terms and
the propriety of race-based differentiations. See Human Rights Comments, supra note 12,
General Comment No. 18, at 25.
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Convention),' 7 is more clearly useful as supreme federal law authorizing
certain forms of race-based affirmative action. As its name suggests, the
treaty contains general provisions outlawing racial "discrimination."'"
Nonetheless, certain "special measures" that can cover certain forms of
race-based affirmative action are expressly excluded from the definition of
proscribed racial "discrimination," which otherwise includes "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race ... which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in . . . public life."' 9 As the Race Discrimination Convention states in
paragraph 4 of Article 1:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or
individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order
to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise
of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed
racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do
not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights
for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. °
There is no exception or limitation expressly related to this article
elsewhere in the Race Discrimination Convention or in the U.S. instrument of ratification. Indeed, in the formal statement of Conrad Harper, the
Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, to Chairman Claiborne Pell of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning ratification of the Race
Discrimination Convention, the Legal Adviser noted: "[A]rticle 1 (4)
explicitly exempts 'special measures' taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals
requiring such protection. As a result, the Convention leaves undisturbed
existing U.S. law regarding affirmative action programs " 2'
Another article in the Race Discrimination Convention generally reiterates the recognized propriety of special measures and adds a

17. Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 11. The treaty was ratified by the United
States on November 20, 1994. See LILLIcH & HANNUM, supra note 3, at 269.
18. See, e.g., Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 11, arts. 2-4, 6, at 216-20.
19. Id. art. 1,para. 4, at 216. See also id. art. 2, para. 2, at 218; de la Vega, supra note 12, at
427,467.
20. Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 11, art. 1, para. 4, at 216.
21. Statement of May 11, 1994 of Legal Adviser Conrad Harper to the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, reprinted in 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 721, 722 (1994). See also infra notes 2930 and accompanying text (regarding similar interpretations of the treaty).
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requirement that certain special measures "shall" be taken in certain
circumstances. Paragraph 2 of Article 2 states:
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take,
in social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete
measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of
certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for *the
purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in
no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or
separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for
which they were taken have been achieved.22
However, the duties contained in Article 2 are generally conditioned by
Article 5, which addresses, among others, the "right to education and
' and states:
training,"23
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in
Article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit
and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour,
or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in
the enjoyment of the following rights ...24
Article 5 does not refer to or condition Article 1(4), but it refers to
Article 2 and would seem to be inconsistent with paragraph 2 of Article 2
unless "special measures" (in Article 2) are considered to involve neither
impermissible "discrimination" (consistently with Article 1(4)'s mandate)
nor impermissible "distinctions" as to race (within the meaning of Article
5). This construction of the Race Discrimination Convention is logical
both with respect to possible meanings of terms and phrases and the
objects and purposes of the treaty evident in Articles 1, 2 and 5., Furthermore, one should construe a treaty in a manner that is logically
consistent and with reference to the terms of the treaty considered in their
context and the treaty's object and purpose. 26

22. Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 11, art. 2, para. 2, at 218.

23. Id., art. 5,para. (e)(v), at 222.
24. Id., art. 5, at 220.
25. See also supra note 12 and infra notes 29-30, 37-41 (regarding ICCPR's special
meaning).
26. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, art. 31, para. 1, at
340. ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be

given the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,§ 325(1), cmnt. b. See generally PAUST, supra note 4, at 286-87, 318,
366-68, 373-76.
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In view of the the U.S. Legal Adviser's statement and Articles 1(4), 2,
and 5 of the Race Discrimination Convention, at least two conclusions
follow: (a) Article 5 does not prohibit special measures of affirmative
action, since Article 1(4) permits them and Article 5 (despite a theoretical
clash with Article 2) does not reach Article 1; and (b) Article 2(2) sometimes requires special measures, since the language "shall, when the
circumstances so warrant," sets up a legal duty under the Race Discrimination Convention and Article 5 can be interpreted in a manner that
prohibits "discrimination" and "distinctions" but not warranted and even
mandated "special measures."' To be sure, outside the context of the Race
Discrimination Convention it may not be as appropriate to differentiate
between "distinctions as to race" and "special measures" designed "to
ensure adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or
individuals belonging to them," but these terms and phrases appear within
the same treaty and should be interpreted as if they are part of a consistent
scheme under the Race Discrimination Convention.2 If not, affirmative
action would remain permissible under Article 1(4), but no such action
would be required under Article 2(2) because of a different, yet unacceptable, interpretation of the reach of Article 5 beyond "discrimination" and
"distinctions" to "special measures."
Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen add:
The Convention's broad formulation of forbidden acts is not,
however, intended to prescribe that all differentiations are unlawful discriminations. The differences made impermissible are those
which fail to establish a demonstrable, rational relation to individual potentialities for self-development and contribution to the
aggregate common interest. The basic requirement of rationality,
that is, an absence of arbitrariness, is implicit in the reference in
Article 1(1)... and is made explicit in Articles 1(4) and 2(2).29

27. See supra note 12 (regarding ICCPR); infra notes 29-30 (regarding the Race Discrimi-

nation Convention), 37-40 (regarding ICCPR).
28. See supra note 26.

29. McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 596. McDougal et al. find support from Dr. W.A.
McKean, The Meaning of Discrimination in International and Municipal Law, 44 BRIT. Y.B.

INr'L L. 177, 185-86 (1970) ("[I]n international legal usage, 'discrimination' has come to
acquire a special meaning. It does not mean any distinction or differentiation but only arbitrary,
invidious or unjustified distinctions ....Moreover, it does not forbid special measures of
protection ....In this respect, the definition accepted in the international sphere is more
advanced and sophisticated than that adopted in most municipal legal systems."). They also cite
Judge Tanaka's opinion in the South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 4, 306 (Tanaka, J., dissenting) (different treatment should be allowed if based on justice).
See also supra note 12 (regarding ICCPR).
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"Thus," they aptly conclude, "these articles provide that appropriate

measures of assistance... do not come within the purview of the prohibition" of race-based distinctions or discrimination.?
AN INTERFACE BETWEEN THE TREATIES

If the U.S. "reservation" concerning affirmative action does not lawfully pertain to the ICCPR31 and the ICCPR is not otherwise interpreted to
allow affirmative action or race-as-a-weight-factor types of "distinction,"
then the provisions of the Race Discrimination Convention should nevertheless prevail and serve as aids for interpreting the Covenant. Clearly, the
Race Discrimination Convention is more subject-specific and detailed
with respect to race-based differentiations, distinctions and discrimination-with greater attention to a fuller range of policies and interests at

stake. Such detail arguably provides normative guidance in connection
with other human rights treaties developed around the same time.32 Additionally, the more specific treaty, developed nearly simultaneously,
arguably prevails in the case of an unavoidable clash between the two
since it pays greater attention to a fuller range of policies and interests at
30. See McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 4, at 596-97. See THOMAS BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 63 (2d ed. 1995) ("This language [in art. 1,
para. 4] suggests that temporary affirmative action programs and preferential quota systems for
minority groups are lawful... ); The Rights of Indigenous Peoples:A Comparative Analysis,
68 PROC., AM. SOC. INT'L L. 265, 276 (1974) (remarks by Louis B. Sohn that affirmative action
is permissible under the Race Discrimination Convention); de la Vega, supra note 12, at 427,
467-68, 470; supra note 12 (regarding ICCPR).
31. Nonetheless, I assume that it does. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
32. The Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR has expressly referred to the Race
Discrimination Convention for guidance. See Human Rights Comments, supra note 12, General
Comment No. 18, paras. 6-7, at 26. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 13, art. 31, para. 3(c), at 340 ("There shall be taken into account, together with the context
... any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties."). Each
treaty contains relevant "rules of international law" vis a vis the other, and the vast majority of
parties to one are also parties to the other. Both multilateral treaties were opened for signature
with U.N. General Assembly resolutions at nearly the same time. See G.A. Res. 2106, U.N.
GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (the Race Discrimination
Convention); G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (the ICCPR).
Additionally, the preamble to the Race Discrimination Convention expressly refers to the
prohibition of a race-based "distinction" under the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (two instruments that the ICCPR also sought to build upon)-the same word
addressed in the ICCPR. See Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 17, at 212-13. This
indicates that the Race Discrimination Convention relates to interpretation of the ICCPR, since
both human rights treaties address the same terms (such as "distinction" and "discrimination")
and refer to the same more basic human rights instruments (i.e., the U.N. Charter and the
Universal Declaration).
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stake that must have been of concern to the international community at the
time of formation of each treaty.3 Further, the Race Discrimination Convention was ratified by the United States two years after ratification of the
ICCPR, so the Race Discrimination Convention, within the United States,
presumably reflects the last will of the American people and, under a
domestic latter-in-time analysis, 4 it arguably prevails.

33. The ICCPR also states: "There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State Party ... pursuant to law,
conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent?' ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 5, para. 2, at
174. The word "conventions" may or may not refer to other international conventions, like the
Race Discrimination Convention, but it seems that "fundamental human rights" are to prevail
even if recognition of such rights in the ICCPR is ambiguous or it "recognizes them to a lesser
extent?' If "special measures" of affirmative action required in Article 2, paragraph 2, of the
Race Discrimination Convention are equated with "fundamental ...rights,' or in other words, if
the duty of States contained in the language: "shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take
special and concrete measures;' is equated with a fundamental right to such measures, it would
seem that Article 5 of the ICCPR assures their primacy (especially within the United States
where the Race Discrimination Convention is a law of the United States as well as a
"convention"). Cf G.A. Res. 41/120, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 53, at 178-79, U.N. Doc. A/41/53
(1987) ("Emphasizing the primacy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights in this network" of "international standards in the field of human
rights.").
More generally, and by analogy, consider the maxims: generalia specialibus non derogant
(general words do not derogate from special); lex specialis generalem derogat or lex specialis
derogat generali (special law prevails over general law); generalis clausulanon porrigiturad ea
quae antea specialitersunt comprehensa(a general clause does not extend to those things which
are previously provided for specially). On lex specialis, see, e.g., J.G. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 457 (9th ed. 1984); Michael Akehurst, The Hierarchyof the
Sources of International Law, 1974-75 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 273, 273; Patricia Anne Kuhn,
Comment, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale: The Supreme Court's Misguided
Approach to the Hague Evidence Convention. 69 B.U.L. REV. 1011, 1050 n.288 (1989); Martin
A. Rogoff, Interpretationof InternationalAgreements by Domestic Courts and the Politics of
International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 591 (1996); Gerhard Wegen, Discontinuance of International Proceedings: The Hostage Case, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 717, 736 (1982)
(citing Hans von Mangoldt, Methods of Dispute Settlement in Public International Law, in
SETTLEMENT OF SPACE LAW DISPUTES 15, 25-26 (Karl-Heinz Bockshegel ed., 1980)); Chris
Wold, Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GAT: Conflict and Resolution?, 26
ENVTL. L. 841, 912 (1996) (citing Sm IAN M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES 98 (2d ed. 1984) and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedureof the
InternationalCourt of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpretationand Other Treaty Points, 33 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 203, 236 (1957)); cf.MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION OF
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 206 (1967) ("It would be better...
to say that specific (central) provisions prevail over general (peripheral) ones only if all other
indices both of the parties' expectations and of relevant community policies so require?').
34. On the "last-in-time" rule generally, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 115;
PAUST, supra note 4, at 81-88, 95-97, 99-101 passim.
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Moreover, one should attempt to read the U.S. "reservation" to the
ICCPR, and the ICCPR itself, consistently with the Race Discrimination
Convention,35 thereby assuring the propriety of the U.S. "reservation"
concerning affirmative action and the Race Discrimination Convention's
"special measures." Indeed, the Human Rights Committee established by
the ICCPR has already interpreted the ICCPR to allow certain forms of
36
"differentiation" in a manner not unlike permissible "special measures."
Textwriters also affirm that neither Article 2 nor Article 26 of the ICCPR
prohibit affirmative action. 7
For example, Oscar Garibaldi writes: "differential treatment ... does
not violate the principle of non-discrimination of the ICCPR unless it
constitutes discrimination" and "discrimination is an objectionable (or not
justifiable) differentiation."38 He adds:
The travaux preparatoires make clear that the drafters of the
[ICCPR] did not intend to prohibit all legal distinctions ... but
only those considered "wrong."... What seems to be required is
that the distinction be, in some sense, justifiable .... There is
clear evidence in the travaux preparatoires that this type of differential treatment ["special measures"] was considered justifiable
and, hence, not discriminatory. Because these "special measures"
do not constitute discrimination, they are not prohibited .... .9
Others similarly state, that Article 2 of the ICCPR:
was intended only to bar unjustified, invidious or improper distinctions; not all distinctions based on the specifically proscribed
criteria are barred. The drafters clearly recognized the legitimacy
35. See supra note 32. They are generally co-equal treaties. Concerning the need to interpret treaties consistently, but with other suggestions as to priorities, see generally the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 4, art. 30, para. 3, and art. 31 para. 3(c), at 33940; RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, §§ 323, 325; also consider the maxim: laws pari materia (laws
on the same subject must be construed with reference to each other).
36. See supra note 12.

37. See, e.g., David Filvaroff et al., The Substantive Rights and United States Law, in
UNTrED STATES RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 125
(Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993) (Article 26 "does not either require or prohibit
affirmative action on behalf of minorities."); Oscar M. Garibaldi, The Principles of NonDiscriminationand Equality Before the Law, in Filvaroff et al., supra, at 62, 65-68; Jose E.
Alvarez, International Law: Some Recent Developments, 46 J. LEG. ED. 557, 561 (1996);
Popovic, supra note 12; Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protectionof the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (1982) (when the ICCPR was created,
"it was generally accepted that the prohibition of discrimination" does not prohibit "special

protective measures, called 'affirmative action' in some countries."); de ]a Vega, supra note 12, at
427,433,445,467-68,470-71.
38. Garibaldi, supra note 37, at 65.
39. Id. at 65-67.
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of some differences of treatment... [and] intended that the article
not be read to preclude the taking of "affirmative action" to benefit disadvantaged or minority groups...

Both treaties adopt special meanings concerning the terms
"distinction" and "discrimination." Clearly, not all forms of differentiation4 are impermissible, and race-based affirmative action is at least
permissible (if not required) under both forms of treaty law of the United
States. Article 2 of the Race Discrimination Convention also mandates
affirmative action "when the circumstances so warrant."
SUPREME FEDERAL LAW

As U.S. treaty law, the ICCPR and the Race Discrimination Convention are supreme law of the land and set important federal policy with
respect to federal preemption of state laws. As such, they will trump

inconsistent state law.4'2 Though the instruments of ratification for each
treaty contain declarations that they are "non-self-executing, 4 3 these
declarations function as reservations that are fundamentally inconsistent4
with the objects and purposes of the treaties and are thus void ab initio. 4
Even if "non-self-executing," the treaties should still trump inconsistent
state law under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the
doctrine of federal preemption.4 ' As the Supreme Court emphasized in
40. Filvaroff et al., supra note 37, at 84.
41. The term "differentiation" seems preferable in order to emphasize the special meanings
that pertain concerning both treaties. For use of such a term or "differential" see supra notes 12,
29 and text accompanying notes 36, 38-39.
42. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAiRS AND THE UNrrED STATES CONSTITUTION 157
(2d ed. 1996) ("[T]he International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights... and other conventions to which the United States is party, are binding on the states and supersede any inconsistent
state law or policy."); supra note 1 and infra notes 45, 47. See also Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J.INT'L L.
217, 234-36 (1994) (preferring a "preeminent federal role" based partly on international law,
especially in contradistinction to California's Proposition 187 regarding education rights of
undocumented alien children); PAUST, supra note 4, at 51-57, 62--64, 67-68, 92, 97, 133-35,
143, 202, 314, 384, 386, 413 (citing numerous cases and documenting the views of the Framers
and Founders).
43. See S. REP. No. 102-23, supra note 12, at 23, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 659 (ICCPR not
self-executing); Statement of May 11, 1994, supra note 21, at 728 (stating that the Race
Discrimination Convention is not self-executing).
44. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 4, at 361-68, 373-76 (quoting Comment No. 24, supra
note 16, paras. 7-9, 11-12, 20, at 3-5, 8). Non-self-execution of the Race Discrimination
Convention would be unavoidably inconsistent with the object and purposes of the treaty and, in
particular, with Articles 2-4, 6-7.
45. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948) (Black, J.,
concurring)
(Human rights articles in the U.N. Charter, which to date have not been found to be self-
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United States v. Pink,4' "state law must yield when it is inconsistent with,
or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty ...[and] must give way
before the superior Federal policy evidenced by a treaty.''

executing, provide additional reasons why a California law "stands as an obstacle to the free
accomplishment of our policy in the international field" and cannot prevail.); id.
at 673 (Murphy,
J., concurring) ("Its inconsistency with the Charter ...is but one more reason why the statute
must be condemned:'); Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F. Cas. 801, 802 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 5,611)
(stating that a seemingly non-self-executing treaty "is supreme" over a state constitution); 6 Op.
Att'y Gen. 291, 293 (1854) (asserting that all treaties are supreme law over that of the stateseven treaties requiring "enactment of a statute to regulate the details"); PAUST, supra note 4, at
62-464, 68, 97, 134-35; Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 947 (1973); BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND WORLD ORDER 192 (1980); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 867 n.65
(1987); Carlos M. Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L.
REv. 1082, 1097-1104 (1992); Quincy Wright, National Courts and Human Rights - The Fujii
Case, 45 AM. J.INT'L L. 62, 69 (1951); supra note 42; infra note 47. But see In re Alien
Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544, 590 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Sei Fujii v. State, 242
P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). Subsequent legal developments have obviated the two prongs of the Sei
Fujii rationale related to its conclusion about the non-self-executing character of the human
rights obligations in the U.N. Charter. See PAUST, supra note 4, at 74, 282. The Supremacy
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2, provides that "all Treaties ...shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby... "'not that some treaties or only
"self-executing" treaties have that effect. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 115, cmnt. e
("any treaty ...supersedes inconsistent State law or policy ....Even a non-self-executing
agreement ... may sometimes be held to be federal policy superseding State law or policy ...
[and] may also ...preempt" (emphasis added)). Professor Connie de la Vega adds that even if
non-self-executing, the treaties can be used to interpret other laws. See de laVega, supra note 12,
at 457 n.206, 460, 467, 470; see also PAUST, supra note 4, at 62-64, 68, 97-98, 134-35, 370,
384, and references cited. She also notes that "governmental entities may use the treaty
clauses defensively without worrying about the non-self-executing declaration because ...
that only affects the basing [of] a private cause of action on the treaty clauses.' De la Vega,
supra note 12, at 467; see also id. at 470 (Even if no private cause of action pertains, "the
standards apply ... and can be used to defend programs designed to meet the goals of the
treaties."); PAUST, supra note 4, at 377-78 n.4.
During the process leading to ratification, the executive explained that the "intent" of the
declaration on non-self-execution "is to clarify that the [ICCPR] will not create a private cause of
action in U.S. courts." See S. REP. No. 102-23, supra note 12, at 19, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at
657. Thus, whether or not the declaration is void ab initio, the "intent" was not to preclude other
uses of the ICCPR, e.g., defensive uses, use under the Supremacy clause, use for purposes of
federal preemption or to provide a compelling state interest.
46. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
47. Id at 230-31. On supremacy more generally, see, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S.
332, 341 (1924); Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909); Chirac v.
Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271, 274-76 (1817); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 344, 348-49 (1809); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199 (1796); Gordon v. Kerr, 10 F
Cas. 801, 802 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 5,611); Hamilton v. Eaton, 11 F Cas. 336, 337-38, 340, 342
(C.C.D. N.C. 1792) (No. 5,980); Page v. Pendleton, 1 Wythe Rep. 127, 129, 132 (Va. High Ct. of
Chancery, May 3, 1793); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 291,293 (1854); supra notes 1,42.
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Each of the treaties also has an understanding that contains a federal
clause. The Race Discrimination Convention's clause is typical. It reads:
this Convention shall be implemented by the Federal Government
to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over the matters therein,
and otherwise by the state and local governments. To the extent
that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction .... the
Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of this Convention.48
Such a clause does not change the fact that permissibility of affirmative
action is assured under the treaty, nor that the Convention's obligations are
to be fulfilled.
Yet, whether or not various entities within the federal government or
the states are to proceed to mandate affirmative action may be a relevant
question for consideration. For example, although Article 2(2) of the Race
Discrimination Convention requires the United States, "when the circumstances so warrant," to take "special and concrete measures," it may be left
to the discretion of the United States to exercise its jurisdictional competence to implement the treaty or to allow states to proceed. 9 If the states
do not proceed, the United States is bound by Article 2 of the treaty to
take action (i.e., there is no gap in the U.S. duty under Article 2 merely
because neither the states nor federal governmental entities have yet
proceeded to adopt special measures). 5
That the federal government has jurisdictional competence to implement treaty law is well understood." Moreover, at a minimum, the states
cannot deny the permissibility of affirmative action assured under the
treaties. Indeed, the federal clauses require that the treaties "shall be
implemented ... otherwise by the state and local governments," thus
making duties under the treaties concurrent.

48. See S. REP. No. 102-23, supra note 12, at 23, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 659; Statement
of May 11, 1994, supra note 21, reprinted in 88 AM. J. INT'L L. at 728.

49. Race Discrimination Convention, supra note 11, art. 2, para. 2, at 218.
50. See David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings,and Declarations,42 DEPAUL L.

REv. 1183, 1201-02 (1993) (stating that the United States remains bound under the ICCPR, that
the United States will also "ensure that the state and local governments fulfill their obligations,"
and that the Understanding "concerns the steps to be taken domestically by the respective federal
and state authorities").

51. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The same applies with respect to customary international law. See, e.g., United States v. Ajona, 120 U.S. 479, 483-88 (1887); Frend v.

United States, 100 F2d 691, 692-93 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939).
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In view of the above, the recent effort in California to outlaw affirmative action"2 is both inconsistent with the provisions of the treaties and
superior federal policy set forth in the treaties and cannot prevail. Under
the Supremacy Clause, California must yield to the permissibility of
affirmative action assured in treaty law of the United States.53 The question
as to the permissibility of affirmative action has also been preempted by
unmistakable treaty law and policy, including the unswerving U.S. Understandings concerning affirmative action. The decision whether to mandate
a particular affirmative action program, however, may not have been
preempted in view of the federal clauses pertaining to each treaty which
leave some discretion in the federal government to allow states to take
affirmative steps to implement the treaties. Yet, the federal scheme is
otherwise complete.
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although treaties cannot prevail in the case of an unavoidable clash
with the U.S. Constitution, 5s treaties can be used as aids for the interpretation and enhancement of constitutional rights, duties, and powers." Thus,
the treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action and related duties can
52. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. See also Michael S. Greve, Prop 209: A Graceful Exit for
the Courts, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1997, at B9; de laVega, supra note 12, at 427-28.
53. See, e.g., Popovic, supra note 11.
54. Concerning federal preemption, see Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F.Supp.
1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), petition for cert. filed,
66 U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Sept. 9, 1997) (No. 97-369) (The District Court granted a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of California Proposition 209 because plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that it is preempted by Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated the injunction.). The District Court in Coalition
for Economic Equity addressed various forms of federal preemption recognized with respect to
federal legislation. For example: (1) field preemption, and (2) conflict preemption, with two
subsets of conflict preemption: (a) actual, and (b) obstacle. Id. at 1510-12. As the court explained, obstacle preemption pertains when state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 1511
(emphasis added) (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987). The
court added that obstacle preemption has occurred even "where states are explicitly permitted to
legislate." Id. at 1512 n.39. This analysis also seems to be relevant to international treaty
preemption where a federal clause allows some leeway for state measures of affirmative action
as long as there is no denial of the permissibility of affirmative action and no interference with
other federal purposes and objectives or affirmative measures. Clearly, the California law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of' the
Race Discrimination Convention.
55. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 4, at 81, 102.
56. See, e.g., id. at 34, 83, 108, 112-13, 191-96, 246, 248-56; de laVega, supra note 12, at
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be used to condition the meaning of relevant constitutional norms, an
approach that should prove useful against attempted extensions of Hopwood v.Texas.5
For example, when considering the phrase "equal protection" (found
in both the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 26
of the ICCPR), one might refer to relevant treaty interpretations of this
and related phrases that clearly allow certain forms of affirmative action.

The word "protection" should be interpreted with reference to all legal
policies at stake and in a manner that allows certain forms of affirmative

action to promote, for each person, an "equal" and effective "protection"
against ongoing processes of discrimination. Further, since international
law is supreme law of the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment
should be interpreted to preclude any state from denying "the equal
protection of the laws" by denying the protection of treaty laws realized in
permissible affirmative action. 8 Such a shared protection, realized ultimately for each person, is protection from ongoing processes of
discrimination, and no state should deny to any person such protection of
the laws.

With respect to the requirement of "compelling state interests" utilized in connection with strict scrutiny tests of racial classifications not
involving treaties, 9 treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action
coupled with U.S. duties under Article 2 of the Race Discrimination
Convention provide a compelling state interest for the United States,' and
57. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116
S.Ct. 2580 (1996). Even Hopwood did not require that laws treat and protect each person at
every social moment in exactly the same way. See id at 946-47. The latter approach might lead
to a denial of the constitutional propriety of any laws protecting special interests or distinctions,
such as certain tax codes, welfare laws, pollution laws, laws providing government subsidies,
laws providing judicial and official immunities, and laws concerning the selection of judges.
58. Concerning the protection of human rights through the Fourteenth Amendment, see
PAUST, supra note 4, at 179-80, 186, 193, 196, 237, 244, 248, 255-56, 315. See also Myres S.
McDougal & Richard Arens, The Genocide Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REV.
683, 708 (1950).
59. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231-32 (1995).
60. See Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (U.S. obligations under
international law, reaffirmed by treaty, support a compelling governmental interest in First
Amendment analysis), rev'd in part and aff'd in part sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
322-24 (1988) ("[T]he fact that an interest is recognized in international law does not automatically render the interest 'compelling' for purposes of First Amendment analysis. We need not
decide today whether, or to what extent, the dictates of international law could ever require that
First Amendment analysis be adjusted to accommodate the interests of foreign officials.");
Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 104142 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982)
("Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive of our
inquiry" regarding "principles of international law" and congressional power.) (quoting
Kleindeienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972)); United States v. Lundquist, 932 F Supp.
1237, 1241 (D. Or. 1996) ("The government clearly has a compelling interest' based in part on
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the Supremacy Clause makes relevant concurrent duties and interests of
the states all the more compelling. 6' Even in Hopwood, several judges had
stressed that "diversity" in higher education can be a compelling state
interest. 6' Treaty-based permissibility of affirmative action and duties to
take "special and concrete measures" must necessarily enhance such a
recognition.
Both the ICCPR and the Race Discrimination Convention ratification
processes produced non-binding provisos that nothing contained in the
treaties shall require the United States to act inconsistently with its Con-

stitution, 3 but such a proviso is basically content neutral. Thus, it demands
and precludes no particular interpretation or reinterpretation of the Con-

stitution."
CONCLUSION

Race-based affirmative action in higher education is permissible under
treaty law of the United States and is even required "when the circumstances
so warrant.: As supreme law of the land and superior federal policy, the
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (and, thus, a treay base as well) in maintaining the viability of
eagles as a species in opposition religious interests.); Jewish Defense League, Inc. v. Washington, 347 F Supp. 1300, 1301 (D.D.C. 1972) ("paramount governmental interest" stems from
international law); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 52, 52-53 (1852) (prosecution for criminal libel is permissible regarding publication that inspires "foreign minister with fears of being killed" and domestic
"law is strengthened by the law of nations"); de la Vega, supra note 12, at 468, 470; cf. Bullfrog
Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1988) (The government did not advance a
compelling state interest and "[c]ertainly the existence of a Treaty does not by itself justify
content-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.).
61. See de la Vega, supra note 12, at 468, 470. Professor de la Vega correctly states: "The
treaty obligations themselves can constitute a compelling state interest. This is particularly true
for the United States government, which has affirmative obligations under [the Race Discrimination Convention] .... Id. at 468. She rightly adds that "states and local entities also are
obligated .... [This] obligation can be the basis of the compelling state interest for affirmative
action programs." Id.
62. 78 F.3d at 964-65 (Wiener, J., concurring) (diversity might be a compelling interest); 84
F3d at 724 & n.1 1 (Politz, J., dissenting) (stating that Justice Powell's diversity analysis in
Bakke has continued validity and "student body diversity is a compelling governmental interest
for the purposes of strict scrutiny"); id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
63. See S. REP. No. 102-23, supra note 12, at 24, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. at 660; Statement
of May 11, 1994, supra note 21, reprinted in 88 AM. J. INT'L L. at 728. Neither proviso was
included in an instrument of ratification. Thus, they are not part of either treaty. To save the
United States from violating either treaty if it follows its own Constitution in contradistinction to
the treaty, the provisos should have been reservations.
64. See, e.g., PAUST, supra note 4, at 313-14, 370, 384-85.
65. See Popovic, supra note 12 (Treaty law "requires-not just permits-parties to take
'special and concrete measures'."); de la Vega, supra note 12, at 471 ("affirmative action ... is
not only endorsed, but required by both treaties").
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permissibility of affirmative action assured under U.S. treaty law must
prevail over inconsistent state law or action. This does not guarantee that
particular measures of affirmative action will survive all constitutional
challenges, but the propriety of affirmative action under treaty law of the
United States and related duties provide compelling state interests and can
contribute to a continuing or evolving meaning of the Constitution compatible with generally shared values and human dignity.'

66. For a discussion of human dignity as a constitutional precept, see Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Inquiry Into Criteria and
Content, 27 How. L.J. 145 (1984).

